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Abstract: ISO 26262, the functional safety standard for automotive electric and electronic (E/E) systems, 
requires a controllability assessment to be made as part of the hazard and risk classification process. As 
well as influencing the function’s Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL), the verifiable controllability 
may also limit the functions intervention options and intensity during normal operation. For electric 
driven vehicles this limits their accident-avoidance/-mitigation potential. For an in-wheel motor driven 
electric vehicle it is questioned whether the failure of a motor could lead to a risk. It is obvious that the 
result of the risk assessment depends on the operating scenarios chosen. As numerous factors define a 
driving situation, the possible detailing of these factors is unlimited. In a previous paper, the results of a 
study regarding the controllability of a vehicle driven by in-wheel motors using a simplified linear 
bicycle model were presented. In this paper we extend the previous work by qualitatively and 
quantitatively identifying the hazards associated with in-wheel motors and by quantify the vehicle level 
effects that could be expected using validated detailed multibody vehicle models in both straight line and 
cornering events. 




For public traffic it is necessary to prove that the residual 
risk, due to hazardous failures or unintended reactions of 
automotive systems, is acceptably low. Requirements for the 
risk assessment of safety-related electric and electronic 
systems in case of failure are provided in ISO 26262 (ISO 
26262: 2011). 
Electric in-wheel drive systems are flexible, modular vehicle 
propulsion systems that revolutionize the way vehicles are 
driven today. Among their advantages are increased 
manoeuvrability and design freedom, and a reduction in the 
packaging space required. In-wheel drive systems need to 
comply with ISO 26262 and therefore research needs to be 
undertaken to ensure sufficient system safety (Hirano 2012), 
(Watts et al. 2010). Of concern is the case where one motor 
fails - besides not meeting the vehicle’s 
acceleration/deceleration requirements - a yaw moment is 
introduced which acts as a disturbance and causes the vehicle 
unintendedly to turn. A question that arises during early risk 
analyses of such a system is the controllability of such system 
hazards. While this question is answered subjectively in early 
stages, very often using worst-case risk graphs, the question 
comes back later in a much more precise way: in cases where 
an in-wheel motor component failure would produce a 
deviation between desired and actual vehicle position, and 
that deviation can be measured in terms of amplitude and/or 
time, how much deviation can be controlled by the driver? 
(Reinelt et al. 2006) 
A literature survey has shown that similar questions have 
arisen for active steering systems, automatic braking systems, 
and active safety systems (Neukum et al. 2008), (Weitzel et 
al. 2013). In many cases empirical studies have been 
conducted that assessed the controllability using a group of 
drivers and vehicles. Objective and subjective measurements 
have led to the definition of maximum allowable limits for 
different vehicle dynamics metrics e.g. yaw disturbance. 
As numerous factors define a driving situation, the possible 
detailing of these factors is unlimited. A side-effect of 
increased detailing is to decrease the rate of occurrence of 
single situations; thereby lowering the perceived risk and 
overall safety level required. Hence, a method is needed that 
allows for the systematic and verifiable derivation of test 
situations, including traceability of the detailing. Automated 
controllability assessment using numerical models might be a 
possible solution, in case they represent reality well. 
In a previous paper, the results of a study regarding the 
controllability of a vehicle driven by in-wheel motors using a 
simplified bicycle model have been presented and discussed 
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(Ellims et al. 2013). It is well known that the validity of the 
bicycle model is restricted only in the linear range e.g. for 
lateral accelerations up to 0.4g and in case of dry road 
conditions (Kanarachos 2009). In this paper, we extend the 
previous work by identifying the hazards associated with in-
wheel motors and by quantifying the vehicle level effects that 
could be expected using validated detailed multibody vehicle 
models. Furthermore, we expand the risk analysis scope by 
considering that the vehicle is equipped with an electronic 
stability control system, like in (Alirezaei et al. 2013), which 
is now mandatory in Europe.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the second 
chapter the problem is formulated by presenting the vehicle, 
driver, driveline and motor failure models used. In Section 3 
the scenarios used for evaluating the controllability are 
described and the maximum allowable limits are shown. 
These scenarios include the application of torque applied due 
to fault of the in-wheel motor electric driveline during 
straight line and cornering events at 150 km/h. The response 
of the vehicle during low mu surface is also investigated. 
Section 4 the numerical results are illustrated and discussed 
while in Section 5 conclusions are drawn. 
In order to reduce the risk of a system component failure two 
possible options exist. The first is to make the component 
physically redundant (Hirano 2012). The second one it to 
reallocate the control commands to the remaining actuators in 
such a way that risk is minimized (Watts et al. 2010). In case, 
of an electric vehicle driven by one or two pairs of in-wheel 
motors the redundancy exists. 
2. CASE STUDY DEFINITION 
2.1 Vehicle Specifications 
The multibody model selected represents a GAC Trumpchi. 
The vehicle is selected as an average sedan vehicle with rear 
wheel drive (RWD) internal combustion driveline, also 
equipped with in-wheel motors at each rear wheel (RWDEV). 
The vehicle specifications used are: 
 Aggregate mass: 1870kg 
 Front / Rear weight distribution:   53.86% / 46.14% 
 Wheelbase: 2.7m 
For the scenarios evaluated in this paper the internal 
combustion driveline is considered to be inactive. Only the 
in-wheel electric motors propel the vehicle. The in-wheel 
electric motors used are from Protean Electric and their 
performance is shown in Figs. 1 and 2.  
 
Fig. 1. Driving performance of the in-wheel electric motor 
 
Fig. 2. Braking performance of the in-wheel electric motor 
 
2.2 Electric motor failure scenarios 
Two electric motor failure scenarios are evaluated. The first 
scenario is an almost instantaneous increase of the braking 
force by the motor, followed by controlled decay within 1.5 
seconds as shown in Fig. 3. This is performed while the 
vehicle attempts to maintain velocity during the event. The 
reason for ‘switching off’ the torque after a time period is 
simply that the response of the driver controller to a fixed 
torque that remains on, is relatively straightforward and the 
driver is able to control the vehicle with much more ease.  
The removal of the failure torque is, in reality a much more 
likely scenario as the vehicle electronics will have intervened. 
The duration of the time before the fault is injected is simply 
to allow the vehicle to settle and the use of 10 seconds is 
arbitrary – it facilitates location of the fault in the results.  
The vehicle usually starts ‘in the air and at speed’ and some 
time is required at the start of the simulation for the tyre 
forces to initialise and also for the controller gains to take 
appropriate control of the model.  This is to prevent the 
controller ‘battling’ the fault and is more reflective of the 
operator removing drive torque upon detection of a problem. 
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Fig. 3. Intermittent fault torque target versus time 
The fault torque applied is limited by the performance of the 
motor. The target maximum torque is selected according to 
the maximum torque the motor can provide. However, 
following the maximum power profile of the motor, the 
maximum torque applied in this scenario is limited according 
to the angular velocity of the motor (Fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4. Applied intermittent fault torque versus time 
The second scenario represents a failure of the inverter 
controlling the electric motor. In case of an inverter failure 
the control of the electronics is disabled and a passive return 
of current from the motor to the battery. The magnitude of 
the current of the system is defined by the difference of the 
back- electromotive force generated by the motor relative to 
the voltage of the tractive system energy accumulator.  In this 
scenario the motors are driven at their maximum power rating 
until the fault occurs. The failure is initially applied to the 
internal wheel (rear left) motor. The safety monitoring system 
recognises the torque difference across the axle and disables 
the second motor across the axis (rear right) after 200ms (Fig. 
5) in order to minimise the yaw momentum applied on the 
vehicle. 
 
Fig. 5. Torque application due to disabled motors 
2.3 Driver model 
A detailed analysis with a 2 degree of freedom (Harty & 
Gade, 2013) vehicle model reveals that in order to reproduce 
the Neukum results the simplified PID Heading Controller 
(outlined in Fig. 6 below) has an infinite bandwidth – in other 
words, the response of the operator is simply too good to 
reflect a typical driver and some tuning of the model is 
required. Consequently, the controller model is tuned (via a 
second order differential equation) to have a specific natural 
frequency at 2Hz and some damping ratio.  
 
Fig. 6. Heading control model to represent the human 
operator defined by Neukum. 
For the straight line event the model behaves very well. 
However for the cornering event the filter implementation 
applied delays the response of the driver. This results in a 
non-decaying oscillation of the steering input (and of the 
vehicle) which human drivers would eventually damp out by 
minimising both the steering torque input and the applied 
steering angle oscillation amplitude. This is implemented by 
an additional low gain PID controller controlling the angle of 
the steering wheel that corresponds to cornering yaw rate. 
This steering angle controller is tuned in line with the 
heading controller in order to damp the steering angle 
oscillation while having minimum impact on the response of 
the driver due to the fault.  
3. SCENARIO DEFINITIONS 
The scenarios investigated include the application of fault 
torque as described in section 2, during straight line and 
cornering events at initial speed of 150 km/h. The cornering 
event target is 0.4g of lateral acceleration. The response of 
the vehicle during low mu surface is also investigated up to 
the point that the vehicle stability is compromised when an 
Electronic Stability Control (ESC) system is also applied. 
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The 10 seconds fault injection is selected in order to allow the 
vehicle model and controllers to settle.  
For the first fault scenario the fault is applied to the rear left 
motor. The same motor is again used as the disabled motor in 
the second scenario. The rear left motor is selected due to the 
increased yaw moment it applies during the failure as in Fig. 
7. When a motor fault torque is applied a negative 
longitudinal force component is applied at the tyre’s contact 
patch proportional to the radius of the tyre. The applied 
longitudinal force component applies yaw moment, in 
relation to the distance from the centre of mass, but also as a 
reduction of the lateral forces at rear axle compared to the 
front axle because of the friction ellipse. During the second 
fault scenario, the reduction of the lateral force due to the 
longitudinal component is similar before and after the fault 
application due to the similar absolute torque applied. 
However, the yaw moment caused by the longitudinal force 
component is still applied because of the opposite torque 
application across the rear axle. In addition due to the 
reversal of the longitudinal acceleration vector there is a 
longitudinal load transfer, unloading the rear tyres and 
loading the front ones affecting the peak lateral force 
capability of the tyres. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Yaw disturbance caused by a motor’s fault torque 
According to Neukum, the peak yaw rate induced for 
irreversible steering fault at 150 kph is 2.5 deg/s, beyond 
which the safety of the vehicle is deemed unstable and 
difficult to control by the driver.. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Straight line scenarios 
The first set of scenarios are set on a straight line at 150km/h 
and only high coefficient of friction with the road mu = 1 is 
considered. Fig. 8 demonstrates the results of the intermittent 
fault application and Fig. 9 the results during the motor 
disabling sequence.  
 
Fig. 8. Straight line performance with intermittent fault 
During the intermittent fault at straight line it is understood 
that the fault injection creates a yaw moment that disturbs the 
vehicle. The sudden wheel deceleration accelerates the yaw 
rate up to 3.5o which is above the threshold defined by 
Neukum, but drops to -1.7o within 0.35s. However the body 
slip angle raises to only 0.6o posing no controllability issues. 
The amplitude of the yaw rate and body slip angle reduce to 
significantly low values as the fault torque also reduces and 
return back to normal within a second after the end of the 
fault torque. This scenario does not reflect any controllability 
issues. 
 
Fig. 9. Straight line performance with disabled motors 
Compared to the intermittent fault, disabling permanently the 
motor creates a yaw moment that raises the yaw rate to 2.7o 
due to the longitudinal force created by the braking fault 
torque. However, the safety monitoring system disables the 
second motor across the driving axle creating a balance of 
longitudinal forces across the driving axle, canceling the yaw 
moment due to differential braking. This creates a decaying 
oscilation of the yaw rate and the body slip angle. The 
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to -0.2o. The vehicle returns back to its initial stability state at 
a similar time as the intermittent fault dispite the different 
nature of the fault. This scenario does not reflect any 
controllability issues. 
4.2 Cornering scenarios 
4.2.1 Intermittent fault torque 
For the cornering scenarios the two types of motor fault are 
investigated separately. Starting with the intermittent fault the 
model has been tested in numerous road friction coefficients 
before selecting the results demonstrated in this paper. At 
high mu the vehicle does not pose any risk of controllability 
as it is demonstrated in Fig. 10. The range of added yaw rate 
is 2.8o to -2.3o and added body slip angle is 0.42o to -0.13o 
which is slightly above Neukum’s range of a permanent fault, 
however the above mentioned peak values are experienced 
for a very short time and decay with a high damping ratio.  
The tyres operate within to just above their linear region 
entering without requiring disproportional increase of slip 
angle in order to provide the additional required lateral force 
for the stability of the vehicle. At lower mu scenarios the tyre 
is already operating at its non-linear region and close to its 
friction limit. At the high mu scenario the yaw moment 
developed by the reduction of lateral forces due to the fault 
times the wheelbase is less significant compared to the yaw 
moment produced by the longitudinal force applied by the 
fault torque times the halftrack distance. This is because the 
tyre operates within the linear region of its cornering stiffness 
and the additional longitudinal force due to the fault will not 
affect significantly the lateral forces applied. On low mu 
scenarios however, as the tyre is operating closer to its 
friction limit, any additional longitudinal forces will 
significantly reduce the lateral forces as the combined force 
applied by the tyre will reach the friction limit. 
The above is demonstrated in Fig. 11, where the vehicle is 
controllable until the application of the intermittent fault 
when the yaw moment applied cannot be controlled because 
of the lack of the rear tyres to produce any additional lateral 
forces. The sudden increase of both the yaw rate and body 
slip angle demonstrate the loss of control of the vehicle 
despite the efforts of the driver. It should be noted that the 
response time of the driver is aided by the behaviour of the 
vehicle as with the increase of yaw rate due to the fault, the 
steering wheel feedback torque is also increased. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Cornering performance with intermittent fault at    
mu = 1 
 
Fig. 11. Cornering performance with intermittent fault at    
mu = 0.62 without ESC 
In Fig. 12 the uncontrolled scenario at reduced mu is 
attempted to be controlled with an ESC control algorithm. 
The resulst demonstrate that the vehicle can be controlled and 
provide safe performance as the added yaw rate (2.76o to       
-2.76o) and added body slip angle (0.57o to -0.19o) control 
peak limits are close to Neukum’s recommendations. The 
oscilations of the yaw rate are caused by the delayed response 
of the driver attempting to control the yaw rate of the vehicle. 
Because of this delay in the driver’s feedback, the yaw rate 
becomes excited by the driver’s input corresponding to 
undamped oscilation with constant amplitude. The small gain 
steering angle control applied by the driver corresponds to the 
emotional response of the driver to maintain the initial 
steering wheel relative to the chosen path. This is despite the 
steering wheel feedback torque as it has been concluded from 
experimental results.  
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Fig. 12. Cornering performance with intermittent fault at    
mu = 0.62 with ESC 
Fig. 13 demonstrates an attempt to tune the driver model 
heading feedback by reducing the filter frequency to 0.5Hz 
and significantly increasing the damping ratio causing the 
driver to respond slower to heading deviations. Despite the 
slower response of the yaw rate osclation frequency has 
increased even if the steering angle curve is now smoother. 
 
Fig. 13. Cornering performance with intermittent fault at    
mu = 0.62 without ESC 
At this stage it is important to understand that the cornering 
scenario at mu = 0.62 is performed while the tyres are already 
close to their friction limit and within their highly non-linear 
cornering stiffness. A scenario like this would be difficult to 
control even with skilled physical driver on a vehicle with 
such behaviour on the friction limit. Fig. 14 demonstrates an 
a cornering scenario at mu = 0.7, with and without ESC 
where with the same driver model the ESC manages 
succesfully to control the yaw rate of the vehicle. 
 
Fig. 14. Cornering performance with intermittent fault at    
mu = 0.65 with and without ESC 
4.2.2 Disabled Motors fault 
Performing the same coefficient of friction as at the 
intermittent fault scenarios, the disabled motors fault is 
deomnstrated below. Fig. 15 results at mu = 1 of the yaw rate 
and body slip angle indicate that there is no controllability 
issue. The range of the added yaw rate is 2.42o to -0.87o  and 
added body slip angle is 0.48o to -0.03o which are within 
Neukum’s recommendations. The disturbance is also smaller 
compared to the intermittent scenario. This is because the 
driver is already controlling the vehicle with recuded lateral 
forces at the rear axle, as the fault changes the direction of the 
applied torque, due to the motor similar limitation of torque 
on both driving and disabled when it is operating at the 
specific angular velocity corresponding to 150km/h. The 
longitudinal load transfer however is affecting the balance of 
the front to rear vertical forces causing a further reduction of 
the friction limit on the rear tyres. 
 
Fig. 15. Cornering performance with disabled motors at     
mu = 1 
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The above is also demonstrated at reduced mu of 0.62 in Fig. 
16 where the vehicle does not need the use of ESC to 
maintain stability. In this scenario, the added yaw rate range 
is 3.87o to -3.83o and added body slip angle of 0.90o to -0.32o 
which is beyond Neukum’s recommendations, however, the 
vehicle manages to return back to its initial state within 
reasonable time after the start of the fault. 
 
Fig. 16. Cornering performance with disabled motors at      
mu = 0.62 without ESC 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Two different fault scenarios have been demonstrated in both 
high and low mu surface. The intermittent fault proved to 
cause significant consern of controlability especially at low 
mu where even skilled drivers will have difficulty controlling 
the vehicle without an ESC. A driver model sensitivity study 
is performed at the low mu cornering event with ESC in 
attempt to demonstrate the relationship between driver 
behaviour and ESC operation. From further simulations it is 
understood that the better the driver manages to hold the 
steering angle during the fault the better the ESC will manage 
to control the vehicle. Once the driver starts to attempt to 
control the heading of the vehicle by his feedback, the system 
enters a loop of non decaying yaw rate oscilation that can 
become unstable in real life. 
The significant difference of the applied faults during 
cornering causing the intermittent fault to be less controllable 
during low mu scenarios is caused by the suddent change of 
the balance of the lateral forces applied by the tyres. This 
suddent change causes greater yaw momentum and grater 
yaw rate overshoot that can be very difficult to control at low 
mu due to high slip angle of the tyre close or even beyond the 
friction limit. On the other hand, the disabled motors scenario 
by inverting the applied torque direction causes less 
overshoot due to the small yaw momentum applied and the 
similar lateral forces applied by the tyres, where the slip 
angle of the tyres do not exceed the friction limit. 
Most of the investigated scenarios can be considered to be 
within or just above the “disturbing” operational limits of 
yaw rate according to Neukum but should be considered safe. 
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